INTRODUCTION
A longstanding problem for policymakers and practitioners has been the issue of low pay.
This issue has been addressed in a number of ways, most commonly through the establishment of a legislated minimum wage, an approach advocated by the International Labor Organization through its Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention (1928) . An estimated 90 per cent of countries in the world operate a statutory minimum wage (ILO, 2014) with Germany joining this group in July 2014. However the existence of a formal minimum rate only provides a floor to wage rates and at levels which may still be regarded as low, particularly if the point of reference is, for example, the median rate of pay. It has been the uncertain impact of minimum wage policy on low paid workers that has given rise to other approaches -such as the emergence of living wage campaigns -to addressing the problem of low pay.
For much of the twentieth century the policy response to the problem of low pay in the United Kingdom was through tripartite Trade Boards that reviewed and determined wage rates in their specified industry (Bayliss, 1962) . Following their demise, a national minimum wage was established in 1999 through the creation of the Low Pay Commission but the problem of low pay has not been resolved and a community-based campaign around the notion of a 'living wage' emerged to secure better than minimum wages. However, the take- To explore the nature of the Living Wage campaign and the challenges it faces this paper first examines the policy context out of which the campaign emerged in East London. Against this background the paper then examines the evolution of the campaign by focusing in the local government sector where low paid occupations are widespread. The experience of a large City Council, 'Metro City', in the north of England which determined to pay the 'living wage' to its employees, provides an opportunity to examine the campaign away from its East London origins, recognising the influence of geography on labour issues (Herod, et al., 2003) . The case examines the role of the principal unions, the General, Municipal and Boilermakers' Allied Trades Union (GMB) and Unison and Unite and also the role of the employers, including service-providing contractors, in the spread or, or resistance to the implementation of the living wage. The analysis of events demonstrates the practical difficulties of implementing the policy of a living wage and highlights some unintended consequences and opportunities for the parties that extend beyond the question of low pay.
THE PATH TO A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE AND MORE
The history of government involvement in determining wages extends as far back as the Statute of Labourers, 1351 (which set maximum rather than minimum rates). More recently, the Fair Wages Resolution 1891 sought to prevent government contractors paying unfairly low wages to their employees. In 1909 tripartite Trade Boards (later called Wages Councils)
were established for selected industries where low wage employment was concentrated (Pond, 1983; Blackburn, 2009; Deakin and Green, 2009) . Wage support in the labour market has also been provided through the Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act, 1975 and the Equal Pay Act, 1970. However analyses of labour markets (Metcalf, 1981; 1999; Grimshaw and Bosch, 2013; Rubery and Edwards, 2003) reveals inadequate protection for employees.
Following his review of the persistence of low pay in the 1970s and mid-1980s Pond (1983:179) concluded that `partly as a result of the economic recession, low pay has once again become a matter of central importance in industrial relations`. He suggested poor labour utilisation, high turnover of staff and the social consequences of poverty on motivation as reasons for raising the level of low paid workers.
In the 1970s the union movement advocated the abolition of specific wage councils on the grounds that they set very low levels of pay and discouraged collective bargaining (Rubery and Edwards, 2003) . Twenty years later the Conservative government took similar view but for different reasons, believing that the existence of the Wage Councils had an adverse effect upon employment. A government review (House of Commons, 1995) of the 26 Councils which covered 2.5 million employees did not advocate their abolition but the ensuing Wages Act, 1986, limited the Councils' role to setting only minimum wage rates in their industry (Machin and Manning, 1994) . The Conservative government finally abolished the Wages Councils in 1993 (Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act, 1993) with the exception of the Agricultural Wages Council (abolished in 2013) (Dickens et al, 1993; DEFRA, 2012) . Their abolition symbolised the end of tripartite, legally binding pay regulation in the UK that had been designed to protect employees in low paid sectors. One consequence of abolishing minimum rates was that it facilitated other policy measures such as contracting out of public services to the private sector (Ascher, 1987; Weinkopf et al, 2013) , there now being no legal requirement for contractors to meet a minimum wage standard (Lucas and Radiven, 1998) . This consequence posed challenges for the union movement (Foster and Scott, 1998; Wills, 2009 ).
Low pay continued to be a problem after the abolition of Wage Councils as increased unemployment rates placed additional pressure on the maintenance of lower wages with an estimated 2 million workers on low pay in 1998 (Brown, 2002; Dickens et al, 1993) . In 1997, the new Labour government formed the tripartite Low Pay Commission (LPC), a permanent body to determine the national minimum wage (NMW). The Commission later gained cross party support following the Conservative Party announcing its adoption of the principle of the NMW in 2000 (Rubery and Edwards, 2003 (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) The LPC is briefed to review the state of the labour market and recommend a minimum wage rate to government; although not obliged to accept these recommendations, governments have. The Commission adopted an evidence-based social partnership approach (Brown, 2009 ) and its first recommendation of £3-60 for adults (see Table 1 ) was regarded as a cautious start but nevertheless raised the pay of 1.7 million workers (Plunkett et al, 2014).
However, successive recommendations of the LPC have not eliminated low pay, merely ameliorated the extent of its influence (Rubery and Edwards, 2003:466) . The Commission has, in effect, become the minimum pay commission, a point acknowledged in the Commission itself:
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The minimum wage is not a living wage: a living wage aims to assess needs and to provide enough for an employee and their dependants to live on, whereas the NMW aims to provide a wage floor which is affordable for business. It may need to be supplemented by other policy measures, principally in the tax and benefits fields, to produce enough for a family or household to live on. (Low Pay Commission, 2014, para 11). Further evidence of the focus on minimum rather than low pay is that in some sectors of the economy the rates set by the LPC are regarded as the going rate with little 'ripple' effect to other workers. The situation of low-income categories (such as women and part-time) is expected to remain unchanged (Robinson, 2002; Whittaker and Hurrell, 2013) . Sectors such as hotel accommodation, care homes, food services and retail set pay rates just above those recommended by the LPC and so the proportion of low paid employees in these sectors remains high at 1.25 million (ONS, 2013; Resolution Foundation, 2014:52) . The problem of low pay is compounded further by a lack of compliance. Current estimates are that at least 279,000 people are still paid below the legally enforceable NMW rate (ONS, 2013) .
One rationale for setting a relatively low NMW is that it then provides point from which unions can achieve negotiated agreements with employers. However, continuing difficulties in organising the traditional low paid sectors and the more general decline in collective bargaining has led the union movement to consider alternative ways to address the problem of low pay (Brown, 2002:602; Rubery and Edwards, 2003:465-66) . At the same time the Conservative-led Coalition government (elected in 2009) expressed a policy preference to provide state support for working families rather than for individuals, implying less priority for labour market policies to address the social and economic consequences of low pay.
The real value of the NMW peaked in 2008 but subsequently declined to be no higher in 2014 than it was in 2005 (Resolution Foundation, 2014 . Experiencing the period of 'austerity' that followed the global financial crisis it is no surprise that low paid workers felt that they were no better off. Against this background, a community movement in East London began to campaign for a 'living wage' (Wills, 2008) . The core argument for the living wage is simply to reduce poverty for working families, many of whom may have dual incomes but still rely on state and community support to survive financially. The additional argument is that raising low wages acts as an economic stimulus since the low paid spend all of their increases in the local economy. groups. The campaign organised a series of public demonstrations supporting workers in several East London hospitals and cleaners in the banks in Canary Wharf. These and other campaigns met with some success; the Olympic Delivery Authority committed to a living wage, resulting in improvements for its low paid employees (Wills and Linneker, 2012) ; community and union engagement resulted in wage increases at two East London universities (Lopes and Hall, 2015; Queen Mary College, 2013) . In 2005 the Greater London Authority developed its own calculations for a London Living Wage (see Table 1 ). The campaign became national through the Joseph Rowntree Foundation providing research on poverty and the low paid (Hirsch, 2013) The CRSP now calculates a Minimum Income Standard (based on a cost of living approach), a figure that is used by the Living Wage Foundation and other organisations as defining the living wage. An alternative calculation is to define low pay as below 60 per cent of the median wage (Rubery and Edwards, 2003; Mason et al, 2008) . This method was supported by the former chairman of the LPC, Professor Bain, as an objective for the adult national minimum wage (Resolution Foundation, 2014) . The economics unit of the Greater London Authority draw on both for their calculations of a London Living Wage (GLA, 2013).
In July, 2015, the Conservative government sought to address, in part, the difference between minimum and 'living' wage rates. It established a new minimum rate category for employees aged over 25 the declaring that the minimum rate £6-70 would be increased for these it is a misnomer to label it a 'Living Wage'. The government's proposed NLW is in fact a minimum wage "premium" for those aged 25 and over (as it is accurately described in the Budget document). Overall, these changes will do very little to improve the incentives for low paid families to find a path into work and then to progress -seen as a key route out of poverty -and for many they will make a difficult situation worse. At the policy level, the emergence of living wage campaign has challenged the role of the LPC. The Commission's 2014 Report rejected the government recommendation to increase the adult rate to £7 (DIBS, 2014) and instead recommended £6-50, generating widespread criticism (Plunkett et al, 2014) . A review of the work of the LPC calculated that employers could absorb average increases in wages of 1-2 per cent which could eliminate low pay for up to 1.4 million low paid workers (Resolution Foundation, 2014). As indicated above, the government's policy response to move towards a living wage has been criticised, as not being a true living wage, and not even the minimum rate for all employees. To examine these issues further, the article will present a case study of how the initial adoption of the living wage by 'Metro City' has led to a ripple effect into other employers in the area. The Living Wage Campaign has been at its strongest in London, where it first developed (Wills, 2008; Wills and Linneker, 2014) but has spread across the country partly through the adoption of the living wage principle by local authorities which, by their nature, are subject to more community influence than are private sector employers. Many councils are now accredited by The Living Wage Foundation (2013) though for reasons that will become clear, Metro City did not apply. Metro City had previously adopted the practice of contracting out significant sections of its in-house services such as refuse collection, cleaning and catering services, particularly in schools. This practice of contracting out provides the context for the examination of the spread of the living wage ideal.
RESEARCH METHOD
Despite the wide range of statistical data on and economic analysis of minimum wages (for example, Arrowsmith, 2009; Grimshaw, 2013; Rubery and Edwards, 2003) there have been few in-depth case studies on what happens after the living wage is established (see Wills et al, 2009; Lopes and Hall, 2015) . The problems of generalizability of the case approach are well recognised (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2003) with a spirited methodological debate on research methods in workplace relations (Fernie and Woodland, 1995; McCarthy, 1994; Millward and Hawes, 1995) recognised the value of case studies in adding further insights to the knowledge provided by surveys. Case study analysis is useful in understanding the dynamics of a situation and how it might evolve (Schofield, 2000; Stake, 2000) which, given the evolution of events in this case, is an important consideration.
Metro City Council was identified as a case study as because it was the first living wage Table 2 ). 
METRO CITY COUNCIL
The case study is of one of the larger metropolitan councils in the UK, referred to here as Metro City. It serves a population of 227,000 residents, has 10,326 employees and a further 3,000 employed by contractors (Local Government Association, 2015) . A chronology of introduction of the living wage at Metro City and subsequent campaigns by the unions is provided in Table 3 . 
Table 3 Chronology of The Metro City Living Wage Campaigns
The notion of a Living Wage emerged out of a history of concerns about the lowest paid in the City. The Council had experienced government-imposed a 3 year pay freeze and although under the provisions of the 'freeze' the lowest paid received an increase of £250 the HRM Director recognised that these employees were 'badly affected' (Metro City HRM Director, March 2013).
In 2010, following informal approaches by two local faith groups to the leader of the Council, Metro City set up a Fairness Commission to make a strategic assessment of the city and to explore the causes, extent and impact of the inequalities in the city and make The decision to pay the Living Wage was a unilateral employer decision. The HRM Director met with representatives of the three unions, GMB, Unison and Unite, prior to making its decision public. In anticipation of this meeting officials from the three unions met and decided to ask for the living wage rate to be consolidated into the base rate, not as a supplement. However they recognised that the pay increase being offered was an employer initiative that was going to be unilaterally implemented so their counter position was more of a request than a demand. The HRM Director stated the unions were not expected to give anything in return for this agreement and so, essentially, 'negotiations were non-existent'.
From the union perspective the fact that the `employer had put this issue on the table for consultation, something it did not have to do, was a positive; it was an open door' (Unison negotiator, 2013).
THE SLOW DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIVING WAGE
Metro City was the first council in the Region to declare itself a Living Wage employer. Its decision impacted other local councils and well as having unintended consequences for Metro City itself. The City's decision was soon followed by Historic, another unilateral employer decision but this emerging trend was met with concern by HRM Directors of other local councils in the region, particularly those authorities that had not contracted out as many services as Metro City ( Table 2 ). The concern was financial with comments such as `Historically most services are delivered in-house and this would mean a pay bill increase of half a million pounds to cover cleaners, catering and schools` (North HRM Director) and the living wage was `unaffordable as there have been no incremental increases since 1999 and would have destroyed our job evaluation scheme and there was no (trade) union push for a living wage' (East HRM Director). In both Councils, those financial constraints remain.
Initially other Councils also decided against paying the increase. HRM Directors in South1, South2 and South3 all made the same point: `We had a set plan. We could not pay the living wage in 2013/14 despite Metro City (setting the rate). Their influence on us (to pay) was nil.
We could not afford (to pay) the (living wage) rate at that time`. These Councils did pay the increase in subsequent budget periods.
If the primary constraint was financial, there were two alternative reasons for adopting the living wage -political or industrial (or a combination of both). Eleven HRM Directors indicated the decision was political, on occasions, explicitly so. This was a political decision with little involvement with HR or the recognised unions. West2 HRM Director stated; `The decision was sent to us and then publicised in the media`.
Neither Part of the low pay strategy was politically sensitive and delayed by a private sector care dispute in the area. This was a major national issue and delayed the announcement for the council until the dispute was resolved.
By 2015 all local councils (South and West) near Metro City had adopted the living wage, in some cases benefiting over 2000 employees. Two others, including the largest (Citywest) made commitments to do so but needed time to lessen the financial impact. Union campaigns were part of the context for decisions in seven of these cases; their campaigns have been resisted in the two Conservative Councils in the region.
EXTENDING THE CAMPAIGN
In addition to the gradual ripple effect on other Councils in the region, Metro City's decision also had internal consequences. Like many other public sector organisations, Metro City delivers a number of its services through contracted arrangements such as refuse collection, cleaning, school catering and some social care services. Metro City's Living Wage policy applied only to its direct employees, not to the employees of contractors (or 'partners' as the City considers them). The dilemma this posed for Metro City and the Council is shown by one unintended and potentially embarrassing consequence. While the Mayor was publicly stating (correctly) that the City was supporting its own directly employed low-wage employees the lady cleaning the office, being employed by a contractor, did not receive the supplement.
Metro City could not enforce its decision on contractors as there was no legal provision in the contracts for wage control by the City, nor was the City prepared to supplement the contract rate to cover an increase in wages. The most Metro City felt able to do was to state, `The Council will seek a commitment to the living wage from potential partners and contractors through procurement processes` (Metro City, 2013, para 4.6). Metro wrote to `partners` with whom they sub-contracted services, explaining the benefits of adopting the living wage and encouraging its partners to do so future. This opened a door for the unions, particularly the GMB and Unison, which then campaigned hard on the living wage issue for its local government staff who were employed by contractors. The GMB had 126 members and Unison 210 members in catering contracts in schools in the Metro City area, an estimated 70 per cent union density rate (GMB Organiser, March 2014). They felt that Metro City's declaration about the living wage strengthened their position and had generated local activism of the union's more general national position on the living wage issue.
It was the GMB rather than the larger Unison that became the most active in the Metro City campaign, mainly due to the GMB having a higher level of membership at the lower grades most affected by any improvement in the minimum wage. The GMB had 10 key contractor companies that it wanted to adopt the living wage and many of these had contracts with Metro City so the union instigated a local campaign with these contractors (see Table 2 ).
Metro City HR Director was aware of GMB's campaign which included a large display in the window of the union office (situated opposite the Council building) that updated its campaign mentioning each company's stance in current negotiations.
Some major contractors such as VEOLIA refuse collection and AMEY road maintenance already recognised the GMB for collective bargaining purposes and had a history of negotiation with them. In 2013 both accepted the principle that their employees working on Metro City contracts were to be paid the living wage but VEOLIA did not extend its this commitment to its own sub-contractors, one of which, SOVA, had been sub-contracted to perform recycling for Metro City. The GMB mounted a campaign on behalf of its 30 members there and while this campaign was in progress the contract became due for retender. SOVA would not commit to a living wage rate but another contractor, 'Green Co', did agree and was awarded the contract. 'Green Co' was a relatively new social enterprise and as part of its overall philosophy believed that paying the living wage was appropriate and so was willing to absorb the additional labour cost. We will return to the union's growing influence on the allocation of contracts in a later section of this paper.
Metro City contracts out cleaning and catering through a Central Schools Tender process involving eight contracting companies. The ensuing contracts are school-specific with the result that one contractor can hold the cleaning contract in a school while another holds the catering contract. These various contracts cover over 500 employees, with 70 per cent union membership (GMB Organiser, 2013) . Other schools in the Metro City area are privately owned and run. They are not subject to the union negotiated employment conditions that apply in public sector schools but they too tend to contract out their cleaning and catering activities. One educational provider LU, operates 37 schools nationally, two of which -A and B -are in the Metro City area. Coincidentally these two schools, managed independently, are just 1.6 miles apart.
The GMB's campaign on behalf of its membership amongst cleaning and catering staff employed in schools was a combination of opportunism and persistence.
We (GMB) had to latch on in this city to go for it (The Living Wage) and that was the message for Schools and Educational sectors. Metro Council are employers but School Governors have employment responsibilities. We asked the Council to send a letter to Schools and Governors asking them to adopt the Living Wage to those outsourced workers as there was a pay freeze (that had been) passed onto the outsourced workers. So Metro City did write to them but not the self-governed schools (they said they would but did not) so we piled on the pressure and sent a letter requesting all schools sign a tick box that indicated they were to become a Living Wage Employer and if the School has a policy with their partners engaged to deliver (sub-contracted) services should pay the Living wage. We had a response from the majority of employers saying 'yes we are a Living Wage employer' but few had a policy for partners. We have got the Metro Council to send letters to Schools asking the Schools how they intend to do this. (GMB Organiser, June 2013) The union's campaign also progressed through activism in the schools with one situation in particular galvanising the campaign. At one State school the cooks were employed directly by Metro City but, as the GMB Organiser explained:
As an employee of Metro City the cooks were awarded the living wage but they also worked as cleaners in the evenings and changed their catering to cleaning tabards [bibs] to Carillon (contractors) and were paid £6-30 -£1 less per hour. This dispute also generated publicity in the local media and radio news and the GMB briefed its members to discuss the inequity of the same roles and different pay in the same school. The GMB wrote to Metro School governors asking them if they have adopted Metro
City recommendation to develop a policy of how they will work to achieve the Living Wage in the future. The majority of schools governing bodies responded.
A second dispute started in two private sector Academy schools, A and B, both owned by LU, highlights the complexity of the contracting arrangements and the difficulties for those trying to establish a sector-wide approach. The GMB official stated:
They [Learning schools] operate separately despite being both managed by the same company and close to each other. Park outsourced the cleaners to avoid paying the living wage. The catering staff at the School had a one-day strike on 6 th November 2013 which resulted in a retender and new contractors, Caterlink, adopting the living wage at A. However, an HR Advisor at B focussed on the minimum wage, not adopting a living wage. Both [schools] now accept a living wage after a second one-day dispute on the living wage. (GMB organiser, March 2014) 9 DEEPENING THE CAMPAIGN Management decisions to contract out services have long been a challenge for unions in the local government sector (Colling, 1995; Foster and Scott, 1998; Wills, 2009) This new practice to involve the unions not only strengthened the Council's commitment to its living wage policy but also gave the union significant influence in the tendering process. The unions now have influence into an area of the employer's strategic decision making that it did not previously have and would not have expected to achieve when Metro City first made its living wage commitment. The GMB has taken the lead in this regard due to it having more members employed by contractors in lower paid occupations. When Metro City put the Central Schools Catering Contract out to tender in November 2013 one criteria for consideration was the potential contractor's commitment to pay the living wage.
This did not automatically guarantee that the living wage would be paid by the successful tenderer, it was still up to the unions to achieve this in direct negotiations. As Metro City's negotiations with its preferred tenderer continued throughout the first half of 2014, the unions were in parallel negotiations with the contractor over pay. As part of this negotiation process the GMB and Unison held a mass meeting of members and also secured an overwhelming pre-strike ballot to assist their efforts at the bargaining table. In June, Metro City announced it had granted the contract to Taylor Shaw in June, 2014, the unions having also secured agreement with that company that its employees working in Metro City schools would be paid the living wage from September (GMB Organiser, 2014) .
CONCLUSION
This article has examined a perennial public policy issue -how to deal with the problem of low pay. The UK experience has been to give a measured support to negotiated arrangements and only recently has established a national minimum wage. The relative inadequacy of this approach has been shown through the emergence of the notion of a living wage, a campaign initiated not only by the unions but by community groups and social welfare organisations.
The challenge of translating a broad ideal of a 'living wage' into the pay packets of employees is a complex process, relying on a mixture of political imperative, employer pragmatism and union opportunism (and some industrial action).
The example of Metro City demonstrates the breadth of those involved in the living wage campaign. As in London, faith and community groups were involved at the outset supporting the establishment of a Fairness Commission by the local authority which opened the way for issues to be considered in other then purely economic terms. At this stage, unions were passive actors; there was no real negotiation on the living wage which Metro City adopted for political rather than industrial relations or labour market reasons.
This benign context at Metro City is not always matched elsewhere and the spread of the living wage to other Councils in the region was through a mutually reinforcing mixture of political pressure from the Labour Party on Labour local authorities and direct union action.
There was little overt community engagement by the unions such as is envisaged in the models of social unionism or community engagement (Fairbrother, 2008; Holgate, 2015) and as had occurred in London. Community support played out through the political process as Labour Councils variously managed the adverse comparison with councils who had found a way to pay the living wage against the adverse financial implications of agreeing to do so.
The Metro City case study highlights the division between primary employers and their sub-contractors with the latter being reluctant to oppose the living wage publically but at the same time being unwilling to commit to it for their own employees. Contracting organisations may feel that if they become a living wage employer they will then risk losing contracts. The alternative is to respond pragmatically to any living wage-related conditions in tenders that they hope to secure. Where the tendering organisations are willing to, in effect, subsidise a contractor to pay a living wage this then raises the question of why the task should be contracted out at all. Further research into the motivations behind contracting-out decisions may reveal a shift from cost-cutting to broader strategic considerations, with implications for those organisations involved in delivering contracted services on the basis of wage-cost competitiveness, and for unions whose members are employed by them.
The impact of the living wage issue provides unions with opportunity of influence in management decision making. The living wage campaign at Metro City put what for unions is a more pressing issue -the employment conditions of a contracted-out labour force -back on the agenda and gave them a far stronger negotiating position. The GMB and Unison at Metro now have an opportunity to influence Council decisions on contracting, an incursion into management decision-making that is an unintended consequence of the East London community campaign. When we then consider the influence of the campaign beyond its London origins, we can see that the impact has been not only geographical but also into areas of management decision making, particularly on procurement and the delivery of services.
This brings the campaign full circle to the point made earlier in this concluding discussion, about the breadth of the campaigning as service delivery in local government is very much a community issue. The influence of the living wage campaign therefore also extends into the union movement and its ability to engage with the broader community. There is a need for further research into the flow-on effects, to parallel the extensive work that has been undertaken in relation to the minimum wage. This economic analysis would be enriched by research from a decision making perspective into the strategies of workers and unions to campaign for a living wage and of employers to adopt (or resist) it. A second area for research is the relative impact of community, social and other pressures on private sector employers compared to the public sector. If a broad community dimension is important to the success of a campaign, how might this be developed in the case, for example, of contract cleaning where there is no obvious delivery of service to the broader community?
A third area for examination is in policy making, particularly whether the newly introduced policy of separate minimum and living wage levels is sustainable and effective as a means of addressing the issue of low pay if the effects are dampened by decreased net take home pay and losses of universal benefits.
